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Memorandum to
Holders of
NIE 11-10-63
19 August 1965

MEMORANDUM

To Holders of

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-10-63

Soviet Capabilities and Intentions With Respect to Chemical Warfare

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated to your left

19 AUGUST 1965

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State


Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant to the
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
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Soviet Capabilities and Intentions With Respect to Chemical Warfare

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
NIE 11-10-63: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND
INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CHEM-
ICAL WARFARE (Secret, 27 December 1963)

1. New evidence requires a revision of the discussion of the Soviet toxic agent stockpile in paragraphs 4 and 7 of NIE 11-10-63. We have now located [] depots which we believe are devoted primarily to the storage of toxic agents; these have an estimated total maximum storage capacity of approximately 380,000 tons. We previously estimated 10 such depots with a total capacity of 300,000 tons. These estimates of total storage capacity do not take account of other possible depots or of field storage on which we do not have conclusive evidence.
2. Five of these depots, with an estimated total capacity of 180,000 tons, are confirmed toxic agent storage sites. Evidence of an expansion of facilities at three of these suggests that present storage capacity is fully utilized or nearly so. In NIE 11-10-63 we thought it prudent to assume that the total toxic agent stockpile, both in depots and available to tactical units, was at least 50,000 tons. The new evidence, which suggests full utilization of certain confirmed storage sites, leads us to conclude that this stockpile is probably at least 200,000 tons and could be considerably larger.
3. On this basis, we would revise Conclusion A of NIE 11-10-63 to read as follows:

A. Our evidence indicates that Soviet organization, equipment, stocks, training, and research and development ~~can support substantial toxic chemical warfare operations. There is insufficient evidence of toxic agent production rates or amounts in stock to make a reliable estimate of the scale on which they could conduct these operations.~~ Main

reliance now appears to be on the very toxic nerve agents. Research and development are continuing, including efforts to develop nonlethal incapacitating agents.

4. We reaffirm the other Conclusions of NIE 11-10-63, which are reproduced below.

B. The Soviets have a variety of chemical munitions for theater operations, but we believe that their use in a long-range strategic role is not now planned.

C. Soviet and European Satellite forces possess a wide range of equipment for defense against chemical warfare, but they still lack a satisfactory means of timely nerve agent detection. Civil defense capabilities are considerably lower than those of the military.

D. We believe that the Soviet leaders think of chemical weapons as essentially tactical weapons, but they consistently group them with nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction." The Soviet leaders thus probably consider them subject to the same political constraints as those imposed on nuclear weapons, and any decision regarding their initial use almost certainly would be made at the highest political level.

E. The Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the use of toxic chemical agents by their theater field forces in a general nuclear war. In a limited war in which no nuclear weapons were being used, they would probably not initiate the use of chemical weapons.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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